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The Challenges Faced by Four African Economies:
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, and the Sudan
Abstract
This paper reviews the recent economic experience of four African
countries, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, and the Sudan. The growth
experience, especially in the last three countries, has been very
disappointing. Agricultural production per capita has declined
steadily, and in the most recent years total industrial output has
fallen. One consequence has been seriously increasing foreign debt
burden, aggravated by heavy borrowing in the past decade for develop-
ment projects, many of which have not been as successful as hoped.
The causes of the disappointing performance are explored. Defective
government policies, particularly the paying of low prices to farmers
for agricultural produce, overvalued exchange rates, and misdirected
industrial development programs have played a major role, as has the
world recession. Various proposals for changes to meet the challenges
are advanced.

The Challenges Faced hy Four African Economies
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania and the Sudan*
John F. Due, Professor of Economics
Jean M. Due, Professor of Agricultural Economics
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Three African countries, Zambia, Tanzania and the Sudan (referred
to subsequently as ZTS) provide excellent examples of the problems and
challenges facing African countries generally, ones analyzed on a
continent-wide basis by the World Bank study, Accelerated Development
in Sub-Saharan Africa . A fourth, Zimbabwe, which achieved majority
rule in 1980, is potentially subject to the same problems. While
these four countries have many problems in common, there are unique
features in each, products of the natures of the economies and
2historical background.
The Characteristics of the Economies
Table 1 shows some basic characteristics of the four countries.
Zambia is the smallest in population, 5.8 million, and Zimbabwe is
only slightly larger. By contrast, both Tanzania and the Sudan have
approximately 19 million. All four countries show population growth
*The authors are indebted particularly to Mr. Kingsley Amoako,
World Bank Resident Representative in Lusaka, for making available his
unpublished paper, Accelerated Development in Zambia (Lusaka: April,
1982), and to the University of Illinois Research Board for financial
assistance.
1
Washington: 1981.
2The authors spent three months in these countries in the Fall
of 1982.
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TABLE 1
Primary Features of the Economies:
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, Sudan
Zimbabwe
Population 1980 (millions) 7.7
Population Growth Rate
1970-80
% of Population in Urban
3.3
Zambia
5.8
3.1
Tanzania
18.7
3.4
Sudan
18.7
3.0
Areas 23 43 12 25
Per Capita GDP US$ (1980) 630 560 280 410
Per Capita GDP US$
(latest year) 1
618
(1982)
530
(1981)
240
(1982)
393
(1982)
Exports as % of GDP 39 45 12
ercentage of GDP (1980)
from:
Agriculture 14 14 51 38
Manufacturing 25 17 10 14
Mining 8 16 1 n
Other 53 53 38 48
Percentage of Labor Force
(1980) in:
Agriculture
Industry
Service
60 67 83 72
15 11 6 10
25 22 11 18
Percent of Exports (1979)
from:
Agriculture 62
Manufacturing 13
Mining 25
2
1
97
90
6
43
96
4
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report (Washington, 1982), and
Accelerated Development in SubSaharan Africa (Washington,
1981); Monthly Statistical Bulletins, Annual Economic
Survey volumes, and Central Bank Annual Reports of the
countries.
n = negligible
These figures are calculated from sources in the respective
countries, and are not necessarily comparable to World Bank figures
shown on the previous line.
2
For Tanzania, 1978 figures from World Bank, Accelerated Develop-
ment are used, as more representative for the country than 1979 figures
Primarily petroleum exports (crude is imported).
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rates (3% and over) in excess of that for Africa as a whole, but coo-
parable to those of the other middle income oil importing countries.
World Bank, data indicate a much higher life expectancy at birth for
Zimbabwe and Tanzania than the others and a much lower infant mor-
tality rate in Zimbabwe, with Sudan the highest child mortality rate
and the lowest life expectancy. Zambia has by far the highest degree
of urbanization, 43%, one of the highest in Africa, Tanzania the
lowest, with 12 percent. Half of the urban population is found in the
two largest cities in the Sudan and Tanzania, only roughly a third in
the other two countries.
Table 1 also shows the relative importance of the major sectors of
the economy in the four countries. The majority of the population is
dependent directly on agriculture in all four countries, with by far
the greatest dependence in Tanzania, the lowest in Zimbabwe. But the
percentage of GDP derived from agriculture shows a different picture;
only Tanzania shows a figure in excess of 50%, and Zimbabwe and Zambia
show figures of only 14 percent. The export picture is also markedly
different, agriculture providing 90% of the exports from Tanzania and
96% from the Sudan, compared to 2% from Zambia, and 62% from Zimbabwe.
The manufacturing sector is most important "n Zimbabwe, providing 25%
of the GDP, compared to figures half that great in the other countries;
manufactures constitute 13% of Zimbabwe's exports, with lower figures
in the other three countries.
Mining provides 16% of the GDP in Zambia (this varies widely from
year to year with changes in world copper prices) , and 97% of the
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exports; it provides 8% of Zimbabwe's GDP and 25% of its exports. The
amounts are small in the other two countries.
The degree of dualism varies substantially. Zimbabwe has the
largest modern non-African element, Zambia a much smaller sector, the
other two only minor percentages. In all African countries the two
parts of the dual economies are slowly merging. The degrees of open-
ness of the economies (exports as % of GDP) vary from 45% in Zambia to
8% in the Sudan.
Table 1 also shows the per capita GDP figures, always subject to
substantial error. Converted to U.S. dollars, the figures range from
$630 in Zimbabwe and $560 in Zambia to $410 in the Sudan and $280 in
Tanzania. Figures for 1982, calculated from sources in the countries,
are slightly lower. Thus, in summary, by usual criteria, Zimbabwe is
the most developed of the four countries, with the highest per capita
real income, the largest manufacturing sector and the only one to have
significant exports of manufactured goods (as distinguished from pro-
cessed mineral products). Yet Zimbabwe does have substantial agri-
cultural exports.
The Growth of the Economies
Table 2 shows the relative growth of the economies over the last
decade. The 1971-79 estimates of percentage changes in GDP are taken
from the World Bank's Accelerated Development volume; the Tanzania
figure is suspect, appearing to be far too high. Complete data are not
1
The 1981 per capita GDP figure for Zambia is $530.
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available from local sources for the 1977-81 period; Zimbabwe shows a
very high figure, Zambia negative (because of copper price declines).
The figures for Tanzania and the Sudan may be negative; at any rate
there was no significant increase. On a per capita basis, for the
decade, the Sudan and Tanzania show increases, the other two,
decreases. But for the more recent years, up to 1981, Tanzania and
the Sudan appear to show negative figures, although for 1982 the Sudan
may have had a net increase, due to sharp increases in farm output.
The 1971-79 agricultural output figures show a limited increase
for all, Tanzania the lowest (increasing doubt about the World Bank's
GDP figures) , Zimbabwe the highest. All showed a decline on a per
capita basis. All of these countries
—
particularly Zambia and the
Sudan—have great unexploited agricultural potential, yet all showed
declines in per capita output of food and other farm crops.
Table 2 also shows the growth in industrial output; in all
countries the rate of growth is far less than the rate of population
growth, except in the Sudan. The more recent figures, where
available, show quite different results; in Tanzania, for example,
output fell 3.5% in 1980-81; output fell 13.1% in Zambia in 1981,
while the figure rose 9.8% in Zimbabwe.
All in all, these figures show a dismal picture; even in the rela-
tively good years, per capita GDP and agricultural output were falling
and in the last two years, with the worldwide recession, the declines
are rauch more serious. The Zimbabwe experience has been better, but
not outstanding.
-7-
TABLE 3
Balance of Payments and Debt Service
Current Acct.
Deficit as % Foreign Debt Service as °i of Foreign Debt
Country of GDP GDP Exports as % of GDP
Zambia (1981) 19.3
Zimbabwe (1980) 5.3'
Tanzania (1980) 14.2
Sudan (1982) 8.5
14.2 40
1.0 5.4
2.7 19
10.2 128
2
71
22
26
32
Sources: World Bank, Accelerated Development in SubSaharhan Africa (Washington:
1981) and World Development Report , 1982 (Washington: 1982); Monthly
Statistical Bulletins, Annual Economic Survey volumes, and Central
Bank Annual Reports of the countries; O.E.C.D., External Debt of
Developing Countries, 1982 Survey (Paris: 1982).
1982, 12% (IMF Survey, April, 4, 1983).
'Projected 1983.
-8-
Table 3 shows the foreign exchange and foreign debt situation of
the four countries. Sudan and Tanzania show merchandise imports more
than double exports; Zambia and Zimbabwe had a surplus on trade
account in 1980; all show a deficit on current account, equal to 19%
of GDP in Zambia, 14% in Tanzania, 9% in the Sudan, 5% in Zimbabwe
(rising to 12% in 1982). Far more serious is the very heavy drain on
the economy caused by service on foreign debt in ZTS; in 1982/83 this
constituted—if met— 128 percent of total exports in the Sudan and 40
percent of total exports in Zambia. The magnitude of the debt rela-
tive to GDP is by far the worst for Zambia, which has a much higher
ratio of exports to GDP than the other countries; Zimbabwe debt and
debt service are relatively low, but rising.
The serious deterioration in the balance of payments situation and
in debt service in ZTS is a product of the severe decline in the terms
of trade for many products of the LDCs , and particularly for copper.
Copper prices fell before the current recession but the decline has
been aggravated by the latter. In the period 1970-79, Tanzania's
income-terras-of-trade fell by 4.4% a year, Sudan's 2.8; Zambia's by
2
9.7, whereas for subSaharan Africa as a whole the figure rose by .6%.
The debt service problems of ZTS have been aggravated by the extensive
borrowing early in the decade, when export prices were better and
funds were readily available; much of the borrowing went into infra-
structure and projects that have not paid off, certainly in terms of
World Rank, World Development Report, 1982 , op. cit., pp.
124-125.
2World Bank, Accelerated Development, op. cit, p. 155.
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exports. As a consequence of this situation, the ZTS countries have
not been able to meet debt service obligations and have been obtaining
extensions, but this of course builds up arrears.
The Causes of the Problems
The discouraging performance of the three economies are products
of a variety of causes, in part misdirected government policies, but
in part products of the underlying factors of the deteriorating terms
of trade due to world economic developments and the inadequacy of
trained personnel for policy determination and implementation in the
years following independence. Consideration will be given first to
agriculture, the basis of the support of the majority of the people of
the countries.
Agriculture . The index of food production per capita (with
1969-71 equal to 100) was 92 in Tanzania, 95 in Zambia, 97 in Zimbabwe
and 102 in Sudan in 1978-80. Thus, except in Sudan, food production
is not keeping up with population growth and, with increasing incomes
and high income elasticities of demand for food, further pressures are
put on the food supply. The disappointing performance of agriculture
has not only affected living levels but resulted at times in severe
shortages, and seriously affected exports as well as imports. The
causes are complex, but several major ones appear to be of primary
importance.
a. Drought . In some years the problems have been aggravated by
inadequate rainfall, including parts of the Sudan and Tanzania in some
Uorld Bank, World Development Report, 1982, p. 110.
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years , Zambia and Zimbabwe in the last two years—a drought that has
extended across the southern hemisphere from southern Africa to
Australia.
b. Government Policies . Zambia provides an excellent example of
destructive government policy relating to agriculture; the Sudan and
Tanzania, in somewhat different ways, are close rivals.
1. Initial neglect. Throughout tropical Africa, in the days
following independence, emphasis was placed upon industrial develop-
ment as the key to modernization and higher per capita incomes, to the
neglect of agriculture. As the industrialization plans have not
realized their objectives, emphasis has shifted back to agriculture,
but only belatedly.
2. Agricultural product pricing policies. The most destructive
government policy, found in extreme degree in Zambia and Tanzania but
to a lesser degree in the Sudan as well, has been the policy of the
governments in setting relatively low prices to the producers of farm
products, particularly of basic foods, in order to assure continued
low prices to urban customers. Partly, this policy was designed to
check inflation, but primarily to avoid strong complaints from the
urban groups, whose political power is disproportionate to their num-
bers. The situation was aggravated by the levying of relatively
high export taxes in Tanzania and the Sudan, thus reducing the prices
received by the farmers since, except in unusual circumstances, an
export tax cannot be shifted to foreign consumers. In the Sudan sales
of produce through local markets are subject to a substantial
(frequently 15%) tax, further discouraging agricultural production.
-11-
There is by now substantial evidence that African farmers, large or
small, are very responsive to price changes—and the policies, there-
fore, have discouraged production for both domestic and export
markets. In the Gezira, Sudan's irrigated cotton producing area, the
policy of charging all project costs of water, etc. to cotton and not
to other crops led to reduced cotton output—the country's chief
export. In Tanzania, high export taxes and inefficient marketing
boards reduced the domestic terms of trade for export crops by one-
third in the 1970s; in addition, inputs were diverted from export
crops to ujaraaa village agriculture from the mid-1970s on. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the volume of exports fell materially.
As the serious effects of low producer prices on output became
apparent, the governments began to subsidize basic foods to allow some
increases in producer prices while holding consumer prices low. The
result, especially in Zambia, was to add seriously to government defi-
cits and to encourage the production of maize at the expense of other
crops. Only in the last two years, under substantial prodding by the
IMF and other sources of funds , have Zambia and the Sudan begun to
reduce subsidies and allow increases in consumer as well as producer
prices. In the Sudan, sugar, now imported in substantial quantities,
has also been heavily subsidized—whereas once it was a source of
substantial government revenue. In the system of panterritorial pric-
ing of basic crops, Zambia and Tanzania followed a national-uniform-
price policy, resulting in serious misallocation of agricultural pro-
duction instead of concentrating it in areas near to markets and good
transport facilities.
-12-
3. Marketing of products and distribution of inputs. Particularly
in Tanzania and Zambia, but to a substantial degree in all four
countries, the marketing of the domestic and export crops has been
placed almost solely in the hands of government monopolies—marketing
boards and similar organizations. This policy partly reflected fear
of expatriate domination of marketing of these goods, concern about
adequacy of facilities, fear of exploitation by local traders, and an
ideological bias in favor of governmental activity. Similarly the
distribution of primary inputs, especially fertilizer and seeds, has
been handled by government monopolies. The results have been little
short of disastrous. Inputs are frequently not received on time;
collection of products is delayed; payment is often not forthcoming
for long periods. The basic problem is that these government agencies
attempt to do too much; they are given tasks beyond their capability,
given shortages of trained personnel. Inefficiency have been well
documented.
4. Foreign exchange rates and policies. All four countries, with
the possible exception of Tanzania, are potentially net exporters of
agricultural products, yet Zambia and Tanzania are net importers, and
the Sudan imports substantial amounts. The underlying source of the
problem is the level of the exchange rates; much of the time the
exchange rate has been set by the government at such a level as to
overvalue the currency. Tanzania is the worst case at present, but
all four countries have at times followed this practice. In Zambia,
the relatively high value of the Kwacha was initially not a product of
poor government policy but of the copper exports, which, given the
-13-
level of imports, insured such a high value that virtualy all farm and
other exports were impossible; they were simply too expensive in terms
of the money of the possible purchasing countries, relative to sources
elsewhere. But the other countries, and Zambia in more recent years,
have created the problem artificially by holding the exchange rate
above the market equilibrium level. The differential is clearly the
greatest in Tanzania. The result is, of course, to discourage exports
and thus production of export products.
This is not the only adverse effect, however. Imported agri-
cultural products are made artificially cheap by the distorted
exchange rate, and thus agricultural products flow in from other
countries. They are usually given preferential tariff and import
quota treatment because they are products widely used. Wheat and
barley have long been major imports to Zambia, and wheat into the
other countries as well. This problem is aggravated by a worldwide
trend by consumers in developing countries to shift from traditional
foods, such as maize and sorghum, to wheat (and in some areas to rice)
as income rises. Most African countries cannot produce wheat nearly
as efficiently as they can other food crops. While these preferences
cannot easily be reversed, development of them has been greatly
encouraged by the foreign exchange and tariff policies, and by exports
of wheat and rice from the U.S. under the PL480 program.
Thus unwittingly, these countries, and in fact most African
countries, have discouraged their own exports of farm products and
encouraged the importation of food products that they themselves cannot
produce efficiently.
-14-
5. Scress on large scale projects. Both government policy and
donor attitudes encourage stress on major large scale agricultural
projects. Some proved successful; others did not, and equivalent
amounts of money on small projects might have brought far greater
returns. At the same time, in the Sudan, deterioration of older irri-
gation facilities in the Gezira has interfered with agricultural pro-
duction.
6. Infrastructure. Like all sectors of economic development,
agriculture has suffered from deterioration of infrastructure and
shortages resulting from foreign exchange policies and shortages.
c. Exodus of Commercial Farmers . Zambia has experienced some
loss of commercial farmers, who produced a substantial share of the
market and export products. While oroduction will undoubtedly return
to earlier levels and beyond, during the transition period production
suffers. Zimbabwe is currently experiencing some loss.
There are some positive linkages to the economies from commercial
farms in addition to the importance of production of major food
staples and exports. Local farmers see results of fertilizer and
higher yielding seed varieties; in working for the commercial farmers
they learn how to drive, repair, and maintain mechanical equipment.
Second hand agricultural equipment flows onto the market for purchase
by small farmers.
Industrial Development . These countries have stressed the impor-
tance of industrial development to provide emplovment, to lessen the
foreign exchange drain from imported goods, and to lessen dependency.
There has been widespead belief that development cannot depend on
-15-
agriculture alone, that domestic production of manufactured goods that
persons desire as their incomes rise is imperative. But only Zimbabwe
has succeeded in developing industry to the point that it constitutes
a signficant element in the economy and in building industry primarily
on the basis of domestic materials.
In the other three countries, the development of manufacturing has
been very disappointing. Output has increased much less than antici-
pated, and in the last few years has actually fallen. Most manufac-
turing provides little value added and little employment; for example,
in Zambia from 1965 to 1975, industry provided only 19,000 jobs— in a
country in which the open unemployment rate is estimated to exceed
20%. Though providing little value added, operation of industry
absorbs a very large portion of total available foreign exchange.
Products are frequently high in cost compared to comparable imports.
The governments receive little revenue—though many have provided or
arranged for substantial funds, often borrowed and thus a source of
interest obligations.
The inherent problems of developing extensive industry, particularly
in countries with little comparative advantage for manufacturing, are
great, but government policy has been seriously defective.
First, almost complete stress has been placed on import substitu-
tion, with encouragement given to importation of the inputs—capital
equipment and materials. This encouragement has taken the forms of
low or zero tariffs on inputs to facilitate manufacturing and of
favorable import licensing policies. Thus value added has been inevi-
tably low, and no stimulus has been given to domestic production of the
-16-
inputs—whereas the doraestic-input-related type of industry alone
offers substantial potential in aiding development. Not only is
domestic production of the inputs discouraged, but the industries are
highly dependent on access to foreign exchange for materials. As
foreign exchange has become scarce, many of the industries are
operating at only a small fraction of their capacity—thus suffering
high costs, losses, and declines in employment or none at all. Even
spare parts are difficult to obtain, a situation that causes further
curtailment of production.
Second, protection has often been excessive and prolonged, thus
eliminating any competitive pressure for efficiency.
Third, industry has become artificially capital intensive,
lessening employment possibilities. This is due to several forces,
particularly overvalued exchange rates, absence of tariffs on capital
equipment (some of the countries do apply relatively modest tariffs),
and artificially low interest rates (often negative in real terms).
Furthermore, wages are artificially high, due either to government
policy or the strength of labor unions, as well as, in Zambia, the
precedent of high wages for expatriate workers. Since independence
Zimbabwe has increased wages substantially.
Fourth, export of manufactured goods has been made almost
impossible by a combination of factors noted above: artificially high
exchange rates, high wage levels (especially in Zambia), and failure
to operate near capacity. Zimbabwe has the greatest potential to
export manufactured goods, which presently constitute 13% of value of
total exports.
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Finally, in the ZTS countries, a substantial portion of the
industrial development has been undertaken by parastatals; as in
marketing of farm products, lack of trained personnel, lack of strong
incentives to hold costs down, and political interference with deci-
sion making have lessened overall efficiency.
Mining . While all four countries have some mining activity, it is
of primary importance in Zambia; copper, plus some cobalt, lead and
zinc, provide 97% of the country's foreign exchange. In good copper
price years copper provides half of the government's revenue and
employment directly to 70,000 persons. Copper prices fell drastically
between 1975 and 1982 and have risen only slightly. The mines require
subsidy at the present price and cost relationships to operate,
although substantial progress has been made in reducing costs. The
longer range problem faced by Zambia is that the known copper reserves
will be more or less exhausted by the end of the century, and increas-
ing costs will be incurred prior to that time.
Zimbabwe likewise has a significant mining sector, although rela-
tively less than that of Zambia and more diversified. Declining prices
have had adverse effects on tbat sector also. Tanzania and the Sudan,
while having some mining activity, are not dependent on it to any
extent. The discovery of oil in the Sudan will improve its foreign
exchange position over the next five years; the wells are expected to
supply an amount equal to about one-fourth of total requirements.
Infrastructure . Tanzania, the Sudan, and to some extent Zambia
suffer from serious inadequacies of infrastructure. Zambia has, of
course, had major transport problems for two decades. The Benguela
-18-
railway route to the Atlantic, the best for many imports, remains
closed because of unsettled conditions in Angola. Tazara is not
operating near to capacity, and Zambia Railways still suffer from
operating problems. Tanzania Railways is able to handle only about
half of the traffic available to it. Sudan Railways has suffered con-
tinued deterioration and traffic loss, to the detriment of both agri-
culture and industry. In Tanzania and Sudan there are serious problems
of equipment shortages and deteriorated track, but many of the problems
center around inadequate trained management and specialist personnel;
even National Railways of Zimbabwe, the most efficient of the five
systems, is commencing to suffer somewhat from personnel problems.
Inadequate road networks, especially in Tanzania and the Sudan,
seriously retard development.
The ZTS airlines, especially in the Sudan, suffer from management
and operational problems; telephone communication, and mail service are
irregular and unsatisfactory in the ZTS countries.
Government Deficits and Capital Formation . As shown in Table 4
,
all of these countries except the Sudan have, for developing
countries, relatively high percentages of tax revenue to GDP, and the
structures of all except the Sudan have been modernized over recent
decades, providing an acceptable balance between direct and indirect
taxes and indirect tax reliance primarily on domestic, levels rather
The railways of the four countries are reviewed in John F. Due,
"Trends in Rail Transport in Four African Countries: Zimbabwe,
Zambia, Tanzania, Sudan," University of Illinois, College of Commerce,
Working Paper #937 (February 1983). A detailed survey of the Tanzania
system is provided by Canadian International Development Agency,
Tanzania Railway Transport Study, Dar es Salaam & Ottawa, 1981.
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TABLE 4
Basic Public Finance Performance, FY 1981-82
Category Zimbabwe Zambia Tanzania Sudan
Population (millions)
Per capita GDP, US$ 1980
Tax Revenue as % of GDP
% of tax revenue from:
7.7 5.8 18.7 18.7
630 560 280 410
29.7 23.6 19.6 10.9
Personal income tax ns 18.6 ns 5.0
Company tax ns 18.8 ns 8.4
Total direct 53.7 40.6 34.7
Customs duties 11.4 7.6 7.1 47.8
Excises 10.6 38.4 35.9 22.8
Sales tax 22.8 13.1 3.1
Total indirect 46.1 59.4 52.0
Export taxes 00 00 13.3 9.9
Deficit in recurrent budget
as % of Current Expend. 10.1 11.1 23.6 4.0
Deficit in overall budget as
% of total expend. 13.2 30.8 23.6 36.0
% of GDP 4.6 15.4 8.7 8.0
Source: Budget documents of the respective countries.
ns : not separately stated.
Totals include miscellaneous items.
16.3
73.8
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than customs duties. But none of the countries has been able to avoid
substantial deficits in their recurrent budgets. The intent is that
the recurrent budget should provide a surplus and thus savings for
financing of development projects; instead, taxes do not cover recurrent
costs. Thus not only is potential capital formation lessened, but
domestic inflation results. The political pressures for expenditures
and demands of government employees for wage increases are so great
that, despite the good performance of the tax structures, the deficits
have not been avoided.
Proposals for Change
While the exact problems of the countries vary, the basic changes
needed to move from the present unsatisfactory situation in Zambia,
Tanzania and the Sudan, and to avoid it in Zimbabwe are similar. Some
of the countries have made considerable progress in the last two
years, others less so.
Realistic Exchange Rates . The most urgently needed policy is to
establish an exchange rate that is realistic in terms of total import
and exchange transactions. Zimbabwe, Zambia and the Sudan all have
devalued within the last year and the rates may be close to the economic
equilibrium figure at the moment, but the Tanzania shilling is still
grossly overvalued. Holding the value of the currency at a higher
than optimal level makes it impossible for most of the -country's
exports to compete in world markets. With Zambia's copper, in which
there is a world price and sales can still be made, domestic produc-
tion is made unprofitable since a smaller number of Kwacha are
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received from a given quantity of foreign currency. At the same tine,
an overvalued currently makes imports artificially cheap, thus
discouraging domestic production (unless offset by adequate tariffs)
and leads to excessive capital intensity of industry, since foreign-
source capital goods are relatively cheap. In manufacturing, foreign
inputs are made cheap relative to domestic inputs, discouraging
domestic production. Likewise, an unbalanced trade situation necessi-
tates import licensing, which is difficult to implement and results in
shortage of spare parts and other items essential for continued opera-
tion of various activities, even when the cost of the item is small.
None of these countries appears able to solve the spare parts problem
when it employs import licensing.
Several objections are raised against downward adjustments of ex-
change rates. First, if a country sells at a lower price (in foreign
currency) to gain world markets and if elasticity of foreign demand
for the product from the county is low (as, for example, will be the
case if total world demand is inelastic and either the country is the
sole supplier or other countries match the price reduction) , foreign
exchange earnings will fall. Or even if the world total demand is
elastic but other countries meet the price reduction and this ccintry
cannot increase its output (as is true with some types of mining) it
will earn less foreign exchange. Rut this is not the typical situation
with world markets that are more or less perfectly competitive and for
which the country is not a major supplier. Perhaps the greatest
danger occurs when the country can economically export only to a
neighboring country for which it is the chief source of supply of the
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commodity, and the demand in that country is relatively inelastic.
But this is not likely a common situation.
A second problem relates to the higher cost of imports. To the
extent that these are inputs for goods produced for export, the higher
cost of imports will in part offset the gains from the readjustment of
the rate of exchange in the export markets. Some domestic production
may have to close down because of the higher cost of inputs. But this
is hardly a conclusive argument against the foreign exchange rate
adjustment; the problem illustrates the danger to a country of heavy
reliance of its export industries upon imported inputs.
Third, and the objection most widely heard in the countries, is
that the exchange rate adjustment will raise the cost of living, par-
ticularly in the urban areas. It is this issue that leads to strong
political objection to devaluation, to excoriation of the IMF both
within the countries and by external observers for insisting on
exchange rate adjustments, and in some instances to riots and
attempted coups. It is true that increases In prices of imported
food are not popular. But they are inevitable sooner or later—and
the sooner that the change is made, the sooner will domestic produc-
tion increase and the reliance on foreign sources , „with consequent
foreign exchange drain, be lessened. The reactions to devaluation
will obviously depend in large part on the success of. the government
in making very clear to the people why the adjustments are necessary.
Fourth, devaluation increases the cost, in money units of the
country, of foreign debt service. But if the change stimulates
domestic production and exports adequately, as it should, the increase
-23-
in the real burden of the foreign debt service may be reduced. In
some of the countries, there is no possibility of meeting the debt
service in the foreseeable future at present exchange rates in any
event. If a country is going to have to have deferments or to default
anyway, it might as well do so on a large figure (in money of the
country) as on a smaller sum. But hopefully the exchange rate adjust-
ment will aid in economic development that will make the foreign debt
service manageable.
A final question relates to the longer range problems of a country
such as Zambia in which the optimal rate of exchange with "normal"
copper prices is substantially different from the optimal with low
copper prices, and wide swings in copper prices can occur very quickly,
Substantial change up and down in the rate of exchange over a period
of a few years is a highly destabilizing force in the economy, and the
high value during the "good" years prevents the diversification of the
exports so essential for long run development—especially in light of
potential exhaustion of copper deposits by the end of the century.
There are only two solutions, given the impossibility of predicting
fluctuations in the price. One is to maintain an exchange rate that
is in some fashion midway between the high-copper-price and low-
copper-price figures, adjusting this at intervals of several years as
the forecasts turn out to be inaccurate. The other is to move to a
two tier exchange rate policy in which the effective exchange rate on
copper is allowed to vary independently of the rate for all other
transactions. Dual rates are maintained currently by Jamaica and
Uganda for example.
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Tariff and Tax Policy . Related to the exchange rate policy is
tariff and tax policy. To encourage production of domestic inputs for
industry and domestic agriculture generally, the policy of no or low
tariffs on such goods should be reversed, tariffs being raised on both
sets of commodities to aid domestic production. On protected
industry, careful review of the amount of effective protection should
be made, to avoid excessive amounts. Similarly, tariffs should be
applied to capital equipment, to avoid encouraging capital intensivity.
At the same time, export duties should be eliminated once and for
all to stimulate export production. These are among the most economi-
cally undesirable taxes ever devised. Equally objectionable are the
taxes on local sales of produce (ushur) in the Sudan, which disorganize
marketing as well as discouraging production of the basic crops.
Except for the Sudan, the countries have basically satisfactory
domestic tax structures. However, there would be great merit in
Zambia in strengthening the sales tax and applying it equally to
imports and domestic goods, eliminating the use of customs duties as
revenue sources. The greatest danger of using high customs duties for
revenues is that domestic production may be encouraged in fields not
in conformity with any sort of logical planning. Customs revenue
inevitably falls as development continues.
The tax structure of the Sudan has been modernized much less than
the systems of the other three countries and warrants general review,
including strengthening the sales tax. The problem in the Sudan is
complicated somewhat by the desire to give the regional governments
some financial autonomy.
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Agricultural Policy . Of all sectors of the economy, agricultural
policies have been perhaps the most detrimental to development. In
addition, to tariff and export duty changes noted above, there are
several important agricultural policy changes required.
First, produce prices must be raised to stimulate output, perhaps
to border (export) prices with a realistic exchange rate. In order to
allow elimination of the subsidies, which have been severe drains on
government budgets, the prices to consumers must be raised to more
realistic levels—or preferably allowed to be determined by free
market forces. This may require some form of more general assistance
to the urban poor; above all it requires adequate publicity to the
people of the country about the change and the need for change.
Second, strong effort must be made to improve the marketing of
farm products and the provision of farm inputs, particularly fer-
tilizer. None of these countries
—
particularly from Tanzania south
—
would be willing to go to a complete system of marketing by private
traders. But increased competition from private traders and others,
particularly at the primary market levels and in the retail distribu-
tion of fertilizer and seeds, almost certainly will bring substantial
gains. Improved systems of payments for farm product and allocation
of credit to small farms also are urgently needed.
Third, of concern to industry as well, there is urgent need for
improved transport
—
particularly, more efficient operation of the
railways, which, despite improvements, are in particularly serious
condition in the Sudan and Tanzania, but to some extent in Zambia as
well. Hopefully, deterioration of the National Railwavs of Zimbabwe
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can be avoided. Foreign assistance in this field is imperative.
Improvement of rural roads serving agricultural areas warrants
priority over highways connecting major cities.
Industrial Policy . A reorientation of industrial policy is
imperative in ZTS countries, moving away from overemphasis of
assembly-type import substitution industries in Zambia, and state
enterprises in Tanzania and the Sudan to ones based upon domestic
inputs and with the possibility of exports. The changes in tariff
policy noted above will assist in this type of change, but appropriate
decision making in granting of tax concessions, if they are to be made
at all, in development of government-owned industry, and in other
forms of assistance can greatly improve the contribution of industry
to economic development. Government wage policy, to prevent wages of
some groups from getting out of line with the rest of the economy and
making exports impossible is also essential.
Conclusion
In general, the economic performance of Zambia, Tanzania and the
Sudan in the 1970s has been discouraging. The worldwide recession
and high petroleum prices and the decline in metal prices have played
a part, but domestic policies, though well intended, have had serious
deterring effects. But breaking away from the existing policies,
which will necessitate politically unpopular increases in the cost of
living, will not be easy. Substantial progress has been made in the
last two years; hopefully it will continue. For Zimbabwe, the
challenge is to avoid the trap into which the others fell. The
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foreign debt situation will continue to hang over these countries like
a dark cloud—but the foreign creditors have little choice but to
extend interest and repayment periods, and to accept some cancellation
of debt. There is no other option open to them.
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